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Abstract
Purpose – Both the academic literature and practitioners have long noted the need for an equity investment
mechanism for worker-controlled firms that alleviates investor anxieties without undermining internal
workplace democracy. The purpose of this paper is to outline one such possible mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach – The proposal locks together the interests of workers and external
investors, via non-voting shares with dividends set by a pre-agreed value-added sharing formula. Each
worker is paid a base wage, with the average across the firm being a pre-defined multiple of the national
minimum wage. Any additional surplus is split into a number of equal “slices”, with each share receiving one
slice as its dividend, and the average worker receiving a pre-agreed number of slices as a bonus.
Findings – Workers have an incentive to maximise their own incomes, and in so doing, will also
automatically maximise the dividends received by investors, obviating the need for the shares to have normal
voting rights. Working on this principle of aligned interests, the authors also discuss reinvestment, worker
ownership of non-voting shares and possibilities for a secondary share market. The authors show how this
proposal will be a significant step in aligning the interests of investors with owner-workers in a democratic,
negotiated way that shares both risk and returns, thus making worker-controlled firms more attractive to
equity investment.
Originality/value – In light of the recognised problem of underinvestment in worker-controlled firms and
the risk of their degeneration, this paper will interest both academics and practitioners in employee
ownership, co-operatives and various forms of workplace democracy.
Keywords Equity, Underinvestment, Workplace democracy, Degeneration, Non-voting share,
Value-added sharing
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
There is increasing popular suspicion that the current economic system dominated by
shareholder corporations has “failed” (Bakan, 2004), particularly since the economic crisis of 2008
(Birchall, 2017). The pathologies of this hyper-competitive globalised system (Scholtz and
Schneider, 2016; Srnicek, 2018), its corrupting influence (Klein, 2007) and its environmental
destruction (Hawken, 2010) are increasingly under scrutiny, particularly in light of the drastically
skewed distribution of income, wealth and power (IPPR, 2018; Norton and Ariely, 2011; Oxfam,
2018). While the problems of contemporary capitalism are myriad, such as the rigging of markets
by monopolistic behaviour (Srnicek, 2018), at the core of the issue is a shareholding structure that
decouples ownership and control in a way that damages investors but also workers: holding
companies, cross-ownership and investment funds all exacerbate the democratic deficit in
capitalist firms (Erdal, 2011). Workers are merely a “resource”, to be exploited like any other
(Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2016).
One response to this popular suspicion of “the system” and awareness of its pathologies
has been growing political support for mixed market economies with a range of ownership
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structures (Barrott et al., 2017; Erdal, 2011), which has received the explicit blessing of past
UK Governments (Bryson and Freeman, 2010; Pendleton, 2011; Pendleton and Robinson,
2017). Employee ownership in particular is perceived to address the need for a new era of
economic development which is “sustainable environmentally, economically, and socially”
(Michie, 2017). Employee ownership has also been given a government boost in the UK, in
the form of the Finance Act of 2014 which granted significant tax advantages to
owner-founders selling their businesses to employees, as well as to the employees
themselves. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and other forms of employee
ownership or “shared capitalism” have for a long time benefited from significant tax breaks
in the USA (Kruse et al., 2010), and numerous other governments also provide fiscal
incentives (Erdal, 2011; Michie et al., 2017).
There are numerous examples of worker co-operatives around the world, such as the
famous Mondragon co-ops in Spain (Barandiaran and Lezaun, 2017), worker co-ops in the
Emilia Romagna region of Italy (Logue, 2006), and a thriving worker co-op movement in
France (Pérotin, 2017), as well as a large variety of different structures of wholly or partly
employee-owned firms (Blasi et al., 2017; Pendleton and Robinson, 2017) or firms controlled by
trusts for the benefit of their workers, such as the John Lewis Partnership, Tullis Russell
(Erdal, 2011), or more recently, Richer Sounds. Trust-controlled firms typically involve a
strong element of common ownership, often with some kind of “asset lock” to prevent
demutualisation (Pérotin, 2017) and the temptation of “selling out” to an external buyer or
buyers, for example to achieve a windfall for the workers (Roberts, 2000).
In many ways, however, the biggest real-world “laboratory” experiment in employee
ownership is to be found in the US. Approximately 14m workers are employed by around
6,500 companies with some kind of employee share ownership scheme, with assets totalling
$1.4 trillion (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2019a). In total, 100 per cent employee-
owned firms are thought to account for around 30–40 per cent of this growing and vibrant sector,
and a far greater fraction are majority employee-owned with strong elements of democratic and/
or participatory governance (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2019b)[1].
Indeed, employee ownership as increasingly practiced facilitates various levels of
employee control, and firms which move away from the shareholder/manager structure
usually aspire to some level of workplace democracy (Meyers, 2011). Moreover, there is
growing body of evidence showing the substantial benefits in terms of the firm’s
sustainability and resilience, “static” productivity, income, and worker job satisfaction and
health which stem from the combination of profit sharing, employee ownership[2] and the
flattening of workplace hierarchies along with some form of participatory or democratic
management[3] and “ownership culture” (Blasi et al., 2017; Fakhfakh et al., 2012; McDonnell,
2012; Nuttall, 2012; Pérotin, 2017; Rosen, 2011)[4]. Workplace democracy and employee
ownership, as well as being about sharing the pie more fairly, are also about growing the pie
more effectively – in a better and possibly greener way (Fakhfakh and FitzRoy, 2018).
However, as with all experiments, things go wrong and unanticipated challenges arise.
There is a need for new, imaginative solutions to several inter-related, stubborn, recurring
problems (Major, 1996). We present one solution, non-voting surplus-sharing shares, with
dividends locked to average bonuses, which we believe could be transformative across a wide
range of different company structures.
This solution aims to address investor concerns about the move towards democratic
control: Can we trust workers who are fully in charge? What would stop them raising their
own wages at the expense of investors? What would be their incentives to invest in their
firm themselves? Would they be competent to run it, or to elect leaders who were?
Conventional wisdom asserts that too few of us will invest in a firm, unless we can protect
our investment by having someone in charge who actively pursues and protects our
interests (McCain, 1999). While there is some recent counter-evidence (Fakhfakh et al., 2012;
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Pérotin, 2017), it seems that democratic worker-controlled firms still generally find it hard to
attract capital (Barrott et al., 2017; Employee Ownership Association, 2012; Erdal, 2011;
McDonnell, 2012; Nuttall, 2012).
The issue can be framed in terms of risk. However, in conventional ownership structures,
risk is not limited to investors. While workers would clearly be taking a substantial risk by
putting “too much” of their own money into their firm, they also take big risks by being
employed by that firm. Their wages could be reduced, they could be made redundant and
lose their livelihoods, or they could end up in far lower-paid jobs. Risk and control are
substantially decoupled in most capitalist firms, both for ordinary investors and for workers
(Erdal, 2011; McCain, 1999), and this may be one root cause of much of the system-wide
dysfunction and hyper-concentration of wealth in the modern economy (IPPR, 2018; Norton
and Ariely, 2011; Oxfam, 2018).
This paper discusses this age-old problem of risk (Pérotin and Robinson, 2004), and builds
on the “FairShares” idea and related models (Major, 1996, 1998; Ridley-Duff, 2015a, b, 2018;
Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2016) to propose an ownership structure that couples dividends to pay,
going some way to linking risk and control and thus enabling true workplace democracy to
thrive while protecting investors. First we discuss the problem of underinvestment and the
danger of an employee-controlled firm “degenerating” back into a standard shareholder
structure. We then present our proposal for tradeable, non-voting, surplus-sharing shares
which lock together the interests of workers and investors, thereby reducing investor risk in
worker-controlled firms and thus increasing the possibilities for investment. We also discuss
some complementary mechanisms to further regulate the relationship between investors and
workers. We assert that this share structure will solve the problems of underinvestment in
workplace democracies while preventing the slide back into standard shareholder structures.
At the same time, it will improve investor protection by coupling dividends to bonuses, by
incentivising and motivating the workforce, and by protecting the workers’ stakes in their own
firm. In the Appendices A1–A7, we work through some examples to illustrate our proposal.
Underinvestment
Despite impressive advances in employee ownership in the USA and UK in recent years
(Michie et al., 2017), as well as various forms of worker takeover of failing firms (Ozerow
and Croucher, 2014; Vieta, 2010, 2012), there are still comparatively few democratic
worker-controlled firms in the world (Barrott et al., 2017). Ruthless Darwinian selection may
be part of the explanation: historically, many worker co-operatives have tended to suffer
from underinvestment, both due to an inability to attract external capital, and due to a
reluctance of workers to reinvest profits (Major, 1996, 1998). Democratic firms find it hard to
attract investment, either internal or external, because they are seen (unfairly?) as too risky
for both workers and investors, and as not providing adequate returns on capital. Clearly,
there are fewer opportunities for capital to extract value from labour in worker-controlled
firms. Also, worker-controlled firms are frequently ideologically hostile to seeking external
capital, and structure themselves to prevent it (Pérotin, 2017). Depending on the country,
there are other barriers such as tax incentives that restrict external investment, lack of
awareness among investors and public sector purchasing decision-makers, lack of
appropriate financial instruments for investing in employee-owned firms (Employee
Ownership Association, 2012), and inadequate government support (Knell, 2008). Worker-
controlled firms struggle therefore, in many countries and industries, to achieve an optimal
mix of capital and labour to maximise productivity, innovation and growth (“dynamic”
productivity) – and can be out-competed by capitalist firms (Barrott et al., 2017; Major, 1996).
In the UK, the most popular model for employee ownership is fast becoming the
employee trust (Pendleton and Robinson, 2017), which in effect holds shares collectively in
the employees’ names. However, in many cases, there is still an unmet need to attract much
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greater risk-sharing “equity-like” capital (Employee Ownership Association, 2012; Nuttall,
2012), despite the existence of several organisations specialising in lending to employee-
owned firms (e.g. the Co-op Loan Fund, Unity Trust Bank). Such debt finance absorbs or
shares far less risk than equity finance, due to the need to pay relatively fixed interest (as
opposed to variable or discretionary dividends), and this may become a further drag on the
company if interest rates go up. The requirement to pay back or refinance the loan
amount itself (the principal) is an additional serious drawback – again, not suffered by
equity finance.
At a very basic level, if one wants to invest risk-sharing, non-repayable equity in worker-
controlled or majority employee-owned businesses, without subverting their internal
democracy, there are still relatively few easy ways to do it (Employee Ownership
Association, 2012; Nuttall, 2012). There are even fewer ways to do it while having in place
credible protections that substitute for direct control or control “by proxy” – relying on a
bigger or controlling shareholder with similar interests, better information and sufficient
power (McCain, 1999). Investing in worker-controlled firms still seems more like a charitable
or ideological act, rather than one born of mutual interest.
One more issue is that if workers cannot extract a reasonable portion of “their” hard-won
equity from a firm, they have a reduced incentive to work towards internally generating
equity (or reinvesting) in the first place. Crucially, the results of lack of reinvestment can
lead firms to “degenerate” back into a standard shareholder structures.
Degeneration
Both financially stressed and successful worker co-ops and worker-owned firms have often
tended, eventually, to “degenerate” back to capitalist control (Barrott et al., 2017; Major,
1996, 1998; Pencavel, 2013). In the case of successful worker co-ops, this may be related to
workers’ inability to extract valuable equity – or, conversely, in the case of employee-owned
businesses, being able to do so too easily, and in the process relinquishing democratic
control. Many in the field now believe degeneration is ultimately more problematic than
underinvestment, although others disagree (Employee Ownership Association, 2012;
Nuttall, 2012). Degeneration has been particularly prevalent among certain types of non-co-
op employee-owned firms. For example, relatively recently, all UK bus companies that were
privatised into employee ownership “sold out” back to concentrated capitalist control
(Pendleton and Robinson, 2017; Spear, 1999), thanks largely to non-wealthy workers being,
in effect, “bribed” by substantial windfalls – mostly unearned (Roberts, 2000).
A somewhat related problem occurs in many thriving worker co-ops; longer-standing
workers may have ploughed back considerable time and earnings (“sweat equity”), and
taken big risks over the years, so they become increasingly reluctant to cede control to
newer “freeloaders”. A number of counter-measures have been devised, such as entry/
membership fees, asset locks (indivisible/non-distributable equity), or holding
non-transferrable worker shares in a trust, (Pendleton and Robinson, 2017; Pérotin, 2017).
All of these have potential drawbacks resulting from workers’ reduced ability to extract
“their” full equity, and may result, therefore, in unintended disincentives, such as
reduced internal reinvestment, and in the case of entry fees, recruitment difficulties (Major,
1996; McDonnell, 2012). The trade-offs, of course, depend on what motivates different
individuals at different stages of their lives including the perceived benefits of being in a
good working environment.
There are notable exceptions of long-lived worker co-ops which have also grown
successfully – such as the Mondragón Co-operative Corporation, in the Basque Country,
Spain (Barandiaran and Lezaun, 2017), the Emilia Romagna co-operative network in Italy
(Logue, 2006) and the SCOP co-ops in France (Fakhfakh et al., 2012; Pérotin, 2017). The
Mondragón group partly solved underinvestment by a federal structure with a “popular
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labour bank” (Caja Laboral Popular) at its heart, and by a system of interest-bearing internal
capital accounts which partially separates ownership from control but does not really reflect
true equity, i.e. the full commercial value of the companies. The group has, out of
pragmatism, taken on large numbers of non-voting employees – but is in the process of
re-democratising (Barandiaran and Lezaun, 2017). We will argue that the non-voting
surplus-sharing equity shares outlined below could help resolve the investment/equity/
democracy dilemmas facing Mondragón and a broad range of other worker-controlled or
employee-owned firms, ESOPs or possible converts. Surplus-sharing shares could also be an
equity investment vehicle for small and medium enterprises in general, where founders
commonly want to maintain control while attracting external risk-sharing investment.
Value-added sharing
Our proposal overcomes the underinvestment and degeneration problems of democratic
worker-controlled firms by tightly locking together the interests of workers and investors.
Workers could then democratically control firms, but would automatically look after investors
(themselves included), in the process of optimising their own incomes, job security and the
long-term prospects of the firm. We build on an elegant mechanism originally devised by
Roger McCain of Drexel University (McCain, 1977, 1999) which makes a firm’s average
worker[5] equivalent to a pre-agreed number of shares, k. The firm’s value-added (¼ sales
minus non-labour costs)[6] is split equally among a number of “slices of the cake”. Each share
gets one slice as its dividend, and each worker gets k slices as their variable pay (averaged
across all workers). So the total number of slices is equal to the (number of shares) + k×(the
number of full-time equivalent workers). If there are S shares andW workers (FTE), there will
be (S + kW) slices, so for value-added £V, each slice will be £ V/(S + kW). Shares could be
non-voting under normal conditions, and the firm could then be governed democratically, by
one-worker one-vote. Part-time workers may be granted pro-rated fractional votes.
Tradeable, (normally) non-voting, surplus-sharing shares
In some firms, this scheme for value-added sharing might result in overall pay being too
variable or too unpredictable. A deal-breaker for most workers is that pay could drop too
low in bad years. This could be mitigated by some kind of national living wage top-up or by
pay insurance (including between federated worker-controlled firms). In addition, the first
tranche of a firm’s value-added could be allocated to a traditional fixed component of wages,
or “Base Pay” (see Figure 1), up to a pre-agreed multiple of the national minimum wage
(averaged over all the workers: some could get more, others less). Any “surplus” P (loosely,
“profit”) above that could then be split equally between all slices: i.e. between shares (as
dividends) and workers (now as bonuses): each slice is now £ P/(S + kW). The average
worker gets k slices (on top of base pay), i.e. an average bonus of £ kP/(S + kW). Each share
still gets one slice as its dividend.
A generic example is shown in Figure 1 (see Appendices A1–A7 for more detailed
examples). Workers would have an incentive to maximise their average earnings. But in
order to do this, they would also have to maximise earnings per share, hence dividends, and
would thus automatically pursue and protect the interests of the investors. This would
apply over the longer term too, via the workers also aiming for job security and growth. The
firm could be democratically controlled by its workforce, yet investors’ interests (long-term
dividend and share value maximisation) would be ensured as an inherent, built-in part of the
arrangement, by being tightly locked to the workers’ overall incomes and prospects.
In order to provide reasonable cash flow to workers, part of the projected annual bonus
could be paid as a monthly bonus advance, or bonuses could be calculated on a monthly
basis, retaining a safety margin till the year end.
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The allocation of the kW workers’ slices between the W different workers (FTE) is decided
democratically. Under this surplus-sharing scheme, different workers can be paid different
numbers of surplus (profit) slices, reflecting skill/scarcity, hours, recruitment difficulty
or danger, or according to other democratically-agreed criteria, so long as the average number of
slices per full-time equivalent worker is kept to the pre-agreed number (k) – or more practically –
within some pre-agreed range (so that workers cannot undercut investor dividends by voting
Total
Base Pay
 Total
Bonus
Total
Divi-
dend
VALUE ADDED
(sum of all  boxes)
Vary
together
(Areas proportional to money)
SURPLUS
Notes: Surplus is value-added minus total base pay. It is divided between a number of equal
“slices”; each share receives one slice as its dividend; average worker is paid a pre-agreed
number (k) of slices as their bonus. If surplus increases, bonuses and dividends increase
proportionately
Figure 1.
Surplus sharing
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to pay themselves more or work less hours). This also means a particular worker’s allocation of
slices may need to be adjusted when other workers join or leave.
As an additional layer of protection, perhaps investors’ prior approval should be needed
before the total fraction of surplus going to workers’ bonuses is allowed to increase beyond a
pre-agreed but renegotiable limit. Workers can also own surplus-sharing shares, either by
buying them off investors or the firm itself, or in lieu of ploughed back bonuses. This further
aligns their interests with external investors.
The central idea here is that the bonus will automatically change as value-added and
hence surplus (profit) change, while keeping the interests of the workers and all investors
aligned far more strongly than if only some of the investors had control and there was a
traditional fixed-wage structure with capital bearing most of the risk.
During a transition phase from traditional capitalist control (Erdal, 2011), fixed Base Pay
might have to start as a high fraction of workers’ expected total remuneration, then gradually be
reduced: due to their lower wealth, workers are often far more risk-averse than entrepreneurs, at
least initially, and it can take time, training and good experience to change attitudes and
“acclimatise”workers to variable incomes, even though these incomes will be potentially higher
and more under their control (Ridley-Duff, 2018). During such a transition phase, because of the
weaker link between workers’ and investors’ incomes, it might be reasonable (or even necessary)
for investors to also have voting rights, again decreasing as the transition to more pronounced
surplus sharing progressed, and trust between the two groups became established.
Illustrative worked examples are presented in the Appendices A1–A7 below, e.g. the
conversion from capitalist control, what happens when the surplus rises, or how the value-added
split changes when the number of workers or the amount of investment is increased.
Emergency or transitional voting rights for investors
To further protect investors, following any year when dividends were below some
pre-agreed target level[7], shares could gain temporary voting rights. Investors could then
effect changes in management to get the firm back on track. Many variants of this are
possible, for example, share vote weightings could be gradually tapered towards zero as the
surplus increased. In any case, investors could always have the right to speak at general
meetings (even if they had no voting rights), so their opinions, knowledge, preferences and
collective wisdom could still feed into and improve the running of the firm.
Giving both workers and shares voting rights (e.g. “one slice one vote”) might be
attractive to some companies and investors, perhaps as a hybrid, transitional or trial
arrangement – a confidence-building stepping stone towards democratic worker control[8].
Such a hybrid company where more than half the surplus (hence slices) went to bonuses
would still be controlled by the workers. Actually, depending on alliances between different
shareholders, it could even be possible for workers to effectively control a company in which
there were substantially fewer worker slices than “investor” slices (a.k.a. shares), especially
if some of the workers owned shares too – i.e. were themselves investors. However, a more
capital-intensive company, with relatively few worker slices compared with investor slices,
would be easier for an organised bloc of investors to control. Nevertheless, because of the
surplus-sharing arrangement, if the investors aimed to maximise their own income per
share, they would still also be indirectly working to maximise the average income of
workers, thanks to the built-in locking together of the two kinds of earnings.
Reinvestment of a portion of bonuses or dividends
Reinvestment of a certain portion of bonuses or dividends would increase reserves
and help the firm to grow. Reinvestment of bonuses would also smooth out pay fluctuations
and prevent workers becoming over-dependent on high bonuses in good years then
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experiencing problems in bad years. It would also reduce the anxiety and expectations
surrounding bonuses.
There are various ways in which reinvestment could be implemented. Onemethod could be by
allocating new shares in exchange for bonuses or dividends at an agreed price, for example, using
independent valuation, or a pre-agreed valuation method such as that in Appendix A5. More
pragmatically, shares could be allocated at prices individual workers and investors (existing or
new) were actually willing to offer, for example via some kind of open auction or sealed bids
system, perhaps within a pre-agreed price range, or up to a pre-agreed target reinvestment. Many
variants are possible, including, if needed, a compulsory component. To protect against undue
“dilution” (Ellerman, 2015), share sales above a certain limit could be subject to approval by the
majority of workers, and maybe also the majority of existing surplus-sharing shares.
Worker capital stakes
As discussed above, the evidence suggests that employee ownership and participation in
management improve productivity in a mutually reinforcing manner (Blasi et al., 2017;
McDonnell, 2012). Reinvestment can help workers build up and hold a pre-agreed minimal
capital stake while they work in the firm, to improve commitment and motivation, and to
further align interests with longer-standing workers and other investors. Internal worker-
investors have a strong incentive to monitor other workers and the running of the firm on
behalf of external investors. They also have an incentive to prevent or report potential
loopholes being exploited (e.g. over-generous expenses, excessively prolonging depreciation
schedules to unjustifiably raise value-added, part-timers masquerading as full-timers or
even “phantom” workers made up in order to raise the number of worker slices kW by
inflating the number of full-time equivalent workers W). Such abuses would also be
minimised by the incentive to keep credible the option of raising further capital in the future,
and the desire to be able to extract one’s own personal capital stake upon leaving. Playing
the “long game” means current investors must be given a good long-term rate of return.
As mentioned above, there could also be limits on changes to the total fraction of surplus
going to workers, beyond which external shareholder approval would be needed.
Secondary market in shares
In addition, surplus-sharing shares would be more attractive if there was a credible way of
selling them on, which would also allow workers owning them to spread their risks or to cash
out. To facilitate the sale of shares, a “secondary” market would need to be set up (perhaps via
some kind of trust, investment club, investment bank, government agency, or organised
by a federation of similar firms). Moreover, a firm could buy back its surplus-sharing shares in
good years, if it was safe to reduce its reserves. This could occur via a sealed bids system in
reverse, i.e. buy back the most cheaply offered shares first, up to a pre-agreed maximum value or
ceiling price. Share prices in the secondary market could also (optionally) be used to help
in the valuation of new surplus-sharing shares issued in exchange for reinvested bonuses or
dividends – and vice versa.
Non-voting surplus-sharing shares could also be a useful tool to help ease the repurchase
obligation liability of US ESOPs – their legal requirement to repurchase the shares of employees
who leave the firm or retire (Cleary et al., 2018). The resulting financial stresses can be
particularly severe when a surge of retirees occurs after a large increase in the value of a firm’s
shares. This has contributed to the (effective) “degeneration” of a number of firms away from
majority employee ownership (Baker et al., 2015), although, typically, individual circumstances
are multi-causal. Some of these ESOP firms have even failed completely. Other ESOP firms have
side-stepped the repurchasing of shares by instead floating some or all of them on a stock
exchange – a recent example is Mayville Engineering, Wisconsin, which is, however, at the time
of writing, still approximately 70 per cent employee owned (Nathan Elwell, Lincoln Churchill
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Advisors, personal communication). Although partial flotation is compatible with maintaining
majority employee ownership in the short term, if repeated often enough, the process could cause
gradual conversion back towards traditional capitalist/investor control. This could be neatly
avoided by floating non-voting surplus-sharing shares instead of voting ordinary shares, and
relying on the formers’ locking of dividends to bonuses, emergency voting rights, and the
productivity benefits of employee ownership and participation (“ownership culture”), to both
protect and encourage investors.
Full recognition of equity
A further advantage of having (normally) non-voting surplus-sharing shares, and the clean
separation-with-alignment of control and ownership that this achieves, is that if a firm’s
market value rises or falls, its equity (sale price – liabilities) is explicitly recognised and
allocated differentially and fairly between particular worker-owners and other investors,
depending on their past contributions and past risk-taking. This could potentially help
worker-owned and controlled firms, such as future Tower Collieries (O’Sullivan, 2001) or the
Mondragon Co-ops, take on new or younger workers, without them having to put in an
initial capital stake equivalent to the current value of that of the original worker-owners
(which in a successful firm may well have been revalued hugely upwards to reflect present
day reality: a challenging and sometimes insurmountable entry barrier for most young and
non-wealthy individuals). The new workers could also safely be given the same democratic
rights as the founders or more veteran owners, without the risk of the latter being “ripped
off”. Thus outside contractors or non-voting “second class citizen” workers would not need
to be employed, as commonly occurs, including in both the examples just mentioned.
If new equipment was needed, but the working capital of the firm was insufficient,
further outside investment could be sought, in exchange for more surplus-sharing shares,
again using valuation, negotiation and/or sealed bids or other auctioning methods to agree a
share price or prices. The combination of proper full recognition of equity, the automatic
locking together of investors’ and workers’ interests and individual exit mechanisms
available via a secondary market, would counter the pressures towards degeneration.
Summary
To recap: we deduct a pre-agreed fixed “base” component of wages from value-added (sales
minus non-labour costs), to obtain the surplus. Each share gets one slice of surplus, and each
worker, on average, gets a pre-agreed number of slices (k). The surplus is split equally
between all slices. Put simply, for the purposes of splitting the surplus, each “average”
worker is equivalent to a pre-agreed number of shares. The mechanism is inherently very
flexible. It allows changes in both the number of workers and the amount of capital invested,
without requiring frequent renegotiation between workers and investors about what
portions of the value-added “cake” go to each group. This could help avoid “perverse”
incentives (see Appendix A7), and so could be a potential (optional) improvement on the
“FairShares” and related models upon which the scheme is partly based (Major, 1996, 1998;
Ridley-Duff, 2015a, b, 2018; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2016). Over the longer term, however, or if
radical transformations are needed in the company, or if market conditions change
substantially, the number of surplus slices per average worker (k) may itself need to be
renegotiated, for example to help recruit new investors or more highly skilled workers.
As some scholars have noted, the spread of “truly” democratic firms could be a major
step towards solving some of the world’s problems (Calvert Jump, 2018; Guinan and Hanna,
2018) – the surplus-sharing mechanism can enable this to happen. This surplus-sharing
mechanism, as outlined here, should solve both the underinvestment and degeneration
problems often experienced by worker-controlled firms, by opening up a much-needed route
for external, non-controlling but risk-sharing “ethical” equity investment into such firms
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(Nuttall, 2012). Surplus sharing can both bring in more capital and allow workers to
diversify part of their own holdings out of their company, spreading their risks (or allow
them to extract all of their equity fairly, if they leave or retire, without causing cash flow
difficulties to the firm). It should enable capitalist firms to be converted to democratic
worker control, while actually improving investor protection, via locking dividends to
bonuses, by incentivising and motivating the workforce, and by giving workers a stake in
their own companies. As well as encouraging more widespread and sustainable adoption of
workplace democracy, this kind of surplus sharing should promote optimal capital-labour
ratios, and hence “dynamic” productivity and growth. It has long been assumed that it is
impossible to have both workplace democracy and sufficient capital investment,
sustainably over long periods, but even a few convincing counter-example experiments
with surplus sharing could undermine this assumption, revolutionising our economic
system and transforming our political landscape.
Markets do not need capitalism: they pre-date it by many millennia (Polanyi, 2002/1944).
Our proposal is a step towards replacing capitalism with economic democracy, while
regaining the benefits of the decentralised economic decision-making and resource
allocation provided by trade and markets. Supply, demand and various auctioning methods
would still help set prices, but without unaccountable capitalist elites running the show.
Prices would still send signals about investment opportunities and priorities. Government
intervention would of course still be needed to correct inevitable market failures (e.g. natural
monopolies), and to prevent environmental “dumping”, to provide safety nets, to redistribute
wealth, and to give overall democratic direction, prioritisation and co-ordination via
planning. However, this intervention should be far more effective than in the past, because
of the internet and vast computing resources that were not available to centrally planned
economies decades ago, including super-computers, neural networks, AI and powerful
optimisation techniques. Likewise, fine-tuning all the details will require considerable
experimentation which can be expedited by unequivocal government support. But there is a
growing consensus that nurturing a more democratic economic system to counter the
destructive excesses of contemporary shareholder capitalism is now an urgent priority.
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Notes
1. US Federal law requires a one-share-one-vote employee secret ballot in ESOPs before all important
company decisions such as recapitalisation, liquidation or sale of firm, etc. (anonymous
communication from reviewer).
2. Partial or complete, individualised via shares or internal capital accounts, and/or more collective
(via trusts holding shares on behalf of workers, or via common ownership).
3. Either worker representation or worker control.
4. This empirical evidence is not unequivocal: e.g. Bellmann and Möller (2016) and Kranz and
Steger (2016).
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5. Full-time equivalent or FTE; someone working half a normal week counts as half a worker.
6. “Value-added” here should not be confused with any increase in market value or rise in equity: that
is capital gains!
7. E.g. if the firm made a nominal loss, i.e. the surplus was negative, because the value-added did not
exceed fixed base wages.
8. The logic would be that, under surplus sharing, both workers and investors are bearing
comparable income risk, per share (slice). If the firm went bust, however, workers could in addition
lose their livelihoods whereas investors would “only” lose their original investment, but hopefully
their risks would be spread and their remaining wealth would cushion them. Which of the two
losses is more serious is much argued, and depends on overall circumstances.
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Appendix 1. Conversion process
Suppose a firm has 100 workers paid an average of £40k each per year, totalling £4m, and suppose it
makes a profit of £1m. Its value-added¼ sales – non-labour costs¼wages + profit¼£4m +
£1m¼£5m. It could be converted to democratic worker control with surplus sharing as follows ( for
example): convert the existing shares into 1m surplus-sharing shares, which yielded a dividend of £1
each in the past year (giving a total dividend, or profit, of £1m still). Say the average “base” ( fixed
component of ) salary is retrospectively agreed to be £20k**, making the average bonus £20k in the
year just gone (so base + bonus add to £40k, keeping average total pay the same as before). (**The
base rate of pay is £10 an hour; 40 h × 50 weeks¼ 2000 hours per year, 2000 × £10¼£20k). This
means the bonus of the average worker is equivalent to k¼ 20,000 shares, as each share yielded a
dividend of £1 and the average worker received (retrospectively) a (nominal) bonus of £20k. The
workers are then allocated an average of 20,000 surplus slices each, shared out depending on each
individual’s actual pay rate, but so there are a total of 100 workers × 20,000 slices per worker¼ 2m
(worker) slices. The total bonus is 100 × £20k¼ 2m x £1¼£2m; see Figure A1(a). So total base pay +
total bonus + total dividend (profit)¼£2m + £2m + £1m¼£5m¼ original value-added. The
numbers add up: surplus¼ value-added – total base pay¼£5m – £2m¼£3m. This is split equally
between 3m slices (2m worker slices + 1m shares), each therefore receiving £1. For now, with this
number of workers, two-thirds of the surplus goes on bonuses and one-third of the surplus goes on
dividends (profits; see Figure A1(a)). The average worker gets £20k base pay and £20k bonus¼£40k
in all, same as before, for the year just gone.
Appendix 2. Surplus sharing process, when value-added changes
Suppose in the next year the value-added increases to £6.5m (see Figure A1(b)). The base pay remains the
same, but now the surplus¼ value-added – base pay¼£6.5m – £2m¼£4.5m. This is divided equally
between 3m slices (worker slices+ surplus-sharing shares), each slice therefore getting £(4.5/3)¼£1.50. The
dividend per surplus-sharing share is therefore now £1.50, and the average worker receives k¼ 20,000
slices × £1.50 per slice¼£30k in bonus. So the average worker receives £20k base pay + £30k
bonus¼£50k in all. The total bonus is 100 × £30k¼£3m, total base pay is still £2m, and total dividend
(profit) is now£1.5m (all three of which add up to £6.5m,¼ the value-added¼ salesminus non-labour costs).
Appendix 3. Change in the number of workers
Figure A2(a) shows what would happen if the number of workers is increased by 50 per cent to 150, and
( for illustrative purposes) the value-added as a result rises to £7m. There are now 150 workers × (20,000
surplus-slices per worker)¼ 3m worker surplus-slices. The average base pay is still £20k per worker, so
total base pay is now £20k × 150¼£3m, instead of £2m. The surplus is value-added – total base
pay¼£7m – £3m¼£4m, and because the total number of slices (worker surplus slices + shares) has
increased to 4m, the surplus per slice (or dividend per share) is £4m/(4m slices)¼£1 (again!). If the firm
takes on 50 extra staff, starting from the situation in Appendix 1 £7m is actually the “break-even” value-
added, above which workers would start to earn more. Other things being equal, workers would therefore
be likely to vote for this change in staff numbers, provided value-added was projected, as a result,
to rise to more than £7m. That way, their incomes would rise (and with them, automatically, investors’
dividend per share).
Appendix 4. Change in the amount of investment, hence the number of surplus-sharing
shares
Starting from the original situation in Appendix 1, suppose that outside capital is invested, in exchange for
another million surplus-sharing shares, so there are now 2m shares in all, giving a total of 4m slices (¼ 2m
share slices + 2m worker-slices). Suppose also, again for illustrative purposes, that as a consequence, the
value-added now rises to £6m. The resulting distribution of income is shown in Figure A2(b): the surplus is
value-added – total base pay¼£6m –£2m¼£4m and the surplus per slice is £4m/(4m slices)¼£1. This is
the dividend per share. The average bonus per worker is £2m/100 workers¼ £20k per worker. Again, this
situation is the “break-even” value-added. So, other things being equal, the workers would probably vote for
this change in investment, provided it was likely to result in a rise in value-added beyond £6m (in this case),
making them, and hence investors, all better off.
Increases in the number of workers or the amount of investment should both raise value-added, if
done right; the real decision is whether this rise would be sufficient to leave everyone better off or not,
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by raising value-added per slice – e.g. because of economies of scale or improved productivity, or
whether diminishing returns would set in in. Either way, workers, by pursuing their own interests,
would automatically look after the interests of the investors too.
Appendix 5. Share valuation
A simple valuation formula involves pre-agreeing a target fractional annual rate of return R, taking
account of the riskiness of the investment and the opportunity costs (e.g. interest rates). The share price
is then set to the present discounted value of future dividends. This can be shown (in a simple case) to
be (predicted annual dividend)/R, although there are more complicated variants also factoring in
projected rate and pattern of growth. Let us say the dividend per share is £1, and that a reasonable
£2m
£2m
= £20k ×100
workers
 Total
Base
 Pay
£2m=
2 million
worker-
slices
× £1
each
£1m
=1
million
shares
× £1
each
Total
Bonus
Total
Divi-
dend
£5m
Value Added=£5m
(all 3 boxes)
Surplus
(£3m)
£0
£2m
£2m
= £20k ×100
workers
 Total
Base
 Pay
£3m= 
2 million 
worker-
slices 
× £1.50
each
£1.5m
=1 
million
shares
×
£1.50
each
Total
Bonus
Total
Divi-
dend
£6.5m
Value Added =£6.5m
(all 3 boxes)
Surplus
 (£4.5m)
£0
(a)
(b)
Figure A1.
Conversion process (a)
and increase in
value-added (b)
Overcoming
the capital
investment
hurdle
target fractional rate of return is agreed between investors and workers to be 10 per cent (¼ 0.1), based
on projected growth, profit volatility and other risks, interests rates and wider stock market
performance. The share price would then be £1/0.1¼£1 × 10¼£10. In other words, one new surplus-
sharing share would be issued per £10 (re-)invested.
Appendix 6. Capital gains fraction
It makes sense to incentivise the workers to strive towards long term as well as short term gains, by
encouraging them to increase the value of the company, for example, by innovation or by investing
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“sweat equity” ( free labour). Therefore, if the firm’s valuation showed a consistent increase over more
than some pre-agreed number of years, to reward the workers, a pre-agreed “capital gains fraction” of
the increase in value could be allocated to them in the form of free surplus-sharing shares. These could
be divided up in proportion to the workers’ surplus slices, or by some other democratically-decided
method reflecting their contributions. The capital gains fraction could be set at (number of worker-
slices)/(total number of slices). This way workers and investors would share longer term capital gains
in essentially the same way they shared shorter-term surpluses, further aligning their interests, and
neatly recognising different forms of investment, such as money, effort, time, danger and ingenuity.
Appendix 7. Why not simply divide the surplus into fixed bonus and dividend fractions?
Earlier related proposals (NOVARS, profit shares: Major, 1996, 1998; FairShares: Ridley-Duff, 2015a, b,
2018) divide the surplus or profit, after deducting base wages from value-added, into pre-agreed bonus
and dividend fractions. The bonus fraction is split among the workers, by a democratically agreed
process, and the dividend fraction is split equally among the shares. The bonus and dividend fractions
can in theory be renegotiated, for example if the company plans to raise new equity capital or expand
its workforce. However, what if there is no agreement, or if the process turned out to be too
cumbersome? Roger McCain (1999) pointed out that perverse incentives could arise, which could cause
the firm to under-invest or under-recruit. For example, suppose for the sake of the argument that
doubling the workforce while leaving capital fixed is predicted to double the surplus – ignoring
any diminishing returns that might set in if capital became a bottleneck. Under these rather rigid
bonus/dividend fractions schemes, the workers would receive the same bonuses on average as now (so
what is in it for them?), yet the dividend on each share would double. (Is this not unfair? What extra
have the investors put in to deserve this?). What is the incentive for the workers to undergo the
disruption, other than maybe charity or working for the common good of society? In a not unlikely
scenario of diminishing returns on capital, so that the surplus less than doubled, the decision would not
be taken, as the workers would actually be worse off. The firm would thus fail to take an opportunity to
expand, even though its surplus would have gone up and its shareholders would have been better off.
The problem is, they would have been “too” better off – at the expense of the workers. (For the sake of
the argument, this assumes only small investment shareholdings by workers themselves). In general,
including “marginal” cases (with small changes), if the number of workers increases by a factor f, but
the surplus increases by a smaller factor g, although the share dividend increases, the workers’
bonuses will decrease. Unless they have substantial shareholdings, workers are likely vote against
such a change.
The outcome would be more beneficial to the firm under the much closer alignment of worker and
investor interests given by the surplus-sharing scheme proposed in this article, with the average
worker equivalent to k shares. The workforce expansion would go ahead, as both workers and
investors would automatically benefit fairly, to the same relative extent. Starting with S shares andW
workers, we proposed to double the workforce to 2W. If the original surplus is P, the new surplus is
predicted to be 2P. The original surplus is split into (S + kW) equal slices. The new number of slices
would be (S + 2kW). The new dividend (one slice per share) would be 2P/(S + 2kW), and the new
average bonus would be k times that, namely 2kP/(S + 2kW). The surplus has doubled, but the number
of slices into which it is divided has less than doubled (because the number of shares S is unchanged),
meaning the surplus per slice goes up and everyone, investors and workers alike, would be better off.
The workers would therefore vote for this change. The argument is essentially the same if an f-fold
increase in workforce leads to an f-fold increase in surplus (just substitute f for 2). The new dividend
(one slice per share) would rise to fP/(S + fkW), and the new average bonus would be k times that.
Under the “worker¼ k shares” scheme in this paper, the workers would also vote for scenarios
involving diminishing returns on capital, providing they (and hence the investors) were expected to be
better off after crunching the numbers: i.e. provided the surplus is projected to go up by more than the
total number of slices, i.e. the extra workers would make everyone better off. If the workforce increases
f-fold, to fW workers, the new number of slices would be (S + k( fW)). If the surplus increases q-fold to
qP, the new dividend per share would be qP/(S + kfW), and the average bonus would be k times that.
Provided new dividend W old dividend, i.e. qP/(S + kfW) W P/(S + kW), the workers would vote for
the change. Simplifying, dividing both sides by P and multiplying both sides by (S + kfW), gives
q W (S + fkW)/(S + kW), i.e. the intuitive condition for voting for the expansion is that the surplus has
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to increase by more-fold than the total number of slices does, so that surplus per slice increases,
dividends go up, bonuses go up by the same fraction, and everyone is better off.
The same basic logic applies to increasing investment. Suppose new external investment could be
made of extra capital that involved doubling the number of shares to 2S (at a negotiated/fair share
price). Suppose again that there are no diminishing returns (labour availability and skills are not
limiting factors), and that this investment is also predicted to just double the surplus to 2P. With the
fixed dividend fraction of NOVARS and FairShares, the dividend per share would be unaltered (twice
the surplus divided by twice the number of shares), but the bonuses of all workers would be doubled
(with no extra effort on their part!). Workers would benefit, but existing investors (those not buying
new shares) would not. If diminishing returns applied (e.g. if labour was a limiting factor), surplus
would less than double, and the existing investors would actually be worse off. So if they had any veto
rights, they would be likely to exercise them. And if they could not, and were consequently
disadvantaged, this would deter others investing in the future – or indeed in the first place (by
“gaming” possible scenarios). So under “rigid” FairShare style bonus and dividend fractions, again
there could be a potential conflict of interest between workers and investors, which could lead to
underinvestment and under-expansion.
These potentially “perverse” incentives are again avoided by using the “average worker equivalent to
k shares” scheme suggested in this article. Continuing the same example, after investing more capital and
doubling the number of shares, the number of slices would increase from S + kW to 2S + kW, so the
dividend per share would now be 2P/(2S+ kW), i.e. it would go up, because the surplus has doubled to 2P,
but the total number of slices has less than doubled, due to kW being fixed. The average bonus per
worker would increase by exactly the same factor as the dividend does, so all investors and all workers
would have exactly the same benefits and incentives. Even if there were diminishing returns to capital,
the workers would decide to go ahead with the investment, providing it left them, and hence the original
investors, better off. There would be no conflict of interest between the different groups. So if the
investment was expected to increase surplus q-fold and resulted in the number of shares increasing r-fold,
the workers would vote for such a change if dividend per share (and hence average bonus) increased,
i.e. if qP/(rS + kW) W P/(S + kW), i.e. q W (rS + kW)/(S + kW). As with expanding the workforce, the
fractional increase in surplus has to exceed the fractional increase in the number of slices.
Putting both types of change together: suppose we could increase the number of workers f-fold and
(externally) invest at the same time, resulting in an r-fold increase in shares, together yielding a q-fold
increase in surplus. Workers would vote for this provided surplus per slice (dividend per share) went
up. New dividend W old dividend if qP/(rS + kfW) W P/(S + kW), i.e. q W (rS + kfW)/(S + kW): again,
intuitively, the fractional increase in surplus has to exceed the fractional increase in the total number of
slices, so that dividends go up, and bonuses go up with them.
The original investors are protected from additional investors or workers reducing their expected
returns on capital by having their dividends locked to workers’ bonuses, and hence their short and
long-term interests are kept automatically aligned to those of the workers, largely obviating the need
for voting rights – as long as the workers are wise enough to make good choices. If the surplus fell
below a pre-agreed trigger level (such as going negative), emergency voting rights for the shares could
kick in, providing another confidence-building layer of protection for investors.
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